Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20143353
AutoresStefan Rinner (0000-0002-0008-3884, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich Munich Germany, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume90
Fascículo1
Páginas8-16
Data de publicação2024-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12504
OpenAlexW4389426166
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas18

So‐called Neo‐Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘ is ’ in a context is the singular proposition o, P, where is the referent of the name in , and is the property expressed by the predicate in . This is also known as the Neo‐Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo‐Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo‐Russellian theory

A priori and a posteriori · Conjecture · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Goldbach's conjecture · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Property (philosophy) · Proposition · Pure mathematics · Referent · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · History · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science