Is nativism sufficient

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20366558
AutoresMartin D S Braine (New York University, autor correspondente)
Ano1994
Volume21
Fascículo1
Páginas9-31
Data de publicação1994-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Child Language (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0305-0009 • E-ISSN: 1469-7602
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0305000900008655
PMID8006097
OpenAlexW2164108888
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas19

The past and present state of the empiricism–nativism issue is analysed. Empiricist philosophical doctrine (‘no innate ideas’) distinguished idea from structure or mechanism. However, Chomsky's conception of innate linguistic universals erased this distinction. The elimination left would-be empiricists without a coherent and defensible position. I argue that the issue remains alive primarily because of tension between two scientific tasks that face students of development. One is to discover what is cognitively and linguistically primitive, a task that encourages nativism. However, nativism is ultimately unsatisfactory because it systematically neglects the other task, which is to account for development, including the emergence of postulated innate primitives. To account for such primitives, it is necessary to relate them to particular central nervous System structures in such a way as to explain how the structure has the particular cognitive effects that define the primitive. That is likely to be difficult, and I show how the study of learning – much neglected in recent years – can help by reducing the number and type of innate primitives whose origin must be explained in that way

Cognitive science · Doctrine · Empiricism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Problem of universals · Psychological nativism · Child and Animal Learning Development · History · Language and cultural evolution · Origins and Evolution of Life · Philosophy · Psychology