Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 20411664 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Peter U Tse (0000-0002-0802-4037, Dartmouth College, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Páginas | 103772 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-11-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Consciousness and Cognition (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1053-8100 • E-ISSN: 1090-2376 |
| Editora | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772 |
| PMID | 39476505 |
| OpenAlex | W4403941937 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 33 |
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neural dynamics and brain function · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology
An information integration theory of consciousness
Integrated information theory
From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness
Biosemantics
Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
Consciousness as Integrated Information
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Account of consciousness by Christof Koch
Towards a computational theory of experience
| Altamente citado | Não |
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