Kantian Remorse with and without Self-Retribution

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20510658
AutoresBenjamin Vilhauer (0000-0001-5692-3945, The Graduate Center, CUNY, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume27
Fascículo3
Páginas421-441
Data de publicação2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415422000140
OpenAlexW4281387563
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas33

Kant’s account of the pain of remorse involves a hybrid justification based on self-retribution, but constrained by forward-looking principles which say we must channel remorse into improvement and moderate its pain to avoid damaging our rational agency. Kant’s corpus also offers material for a revisionist but textually grounded alternative account based on wrongdoers’ sympathy for the pain they cause. This account is based on the value of care, and has forward-looking constraints much like Kant’s own account. Drawing on Kant’s texts and recent work in empirical psychology, I argue that sympathetic remorse may fulfil Kant’s forward-looking goals better than self-retributive remorse

Economic Justice · Epistemology · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Remorse · Retributive justice · Sympathy · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology