Allowed by Right, Forbidden by Ethics

Kant on ‘Unpurposive’ Sex

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21148472
AutoresMartin Brecher (0009-0009-2016-7741, University of Mannheim, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Páginas1-18
Data de publicação2026-07-06
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s136941542610140x
OpenAlexW7167435012
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas31

In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant raises the ‘casuistical’ question of whether sexual intercourse is ethically permissible only if it serves the purpose of procreation, or whether it is also permissible when procreation is not possible, e.g. during pregnancy. It might seem that Kant is assuming a special permissive law that allows ‘unpurposive’ sexual intercourse to prevent greater vices. However, as I shall argue, Kant merely recites an argument that was widespread in the eighteenth century. As a closer analysis of Kant’s argument shows, he in fact regards sexual intercourse incapable of reproduction as ethically impermissible

Argument (complex analysis) · Doctrine · Permissive · Sexual ethics · Sexual intercourse · Historical Studies on Reproduction, Gender, Health, and Societal Changes · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Religion, Gender, and Enlightenment