Methodological Naturalists Need Not Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21244982
AutoresHamed Bikaraan-Behesht (0000-0003-0056-0190, Iran National Science Foundation, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Data de publicação2023-02-14
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoScientia et Fides (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2353-5636 • E-ISSN: 2300-7648
EditoraUniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika/Nicolaus Copernicus University (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.12775/setf.2023.005
OpenAlexW4320727513
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas11

In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism

Commit · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Political science · Presupposition · Chemistry · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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