Mendelow On Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21293418
AutoresTorin Alter (0000-0001-5677-8880, University of Alabama), Derk Pereboom (0000-0002-3891-3417, Cornell University)
Ano2026
Páginas1-6
Data de publicação2026-06-16
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2026.2669939
OpenAlexW7164918341
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas12

According to Russellian monism, there are non-structural properties that both underlie physical, structural properties and help constitute, and thus necessitate, phenomenal properties (Alter and Pereboom Citation2023). Derk Pereboom (Citation2011, Citation2014, Citation2015, Citation2019) characterizes the relevant non-structural properties as absolutely intrinsic properties, where ‘P is an absolutely intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic property of X and P is not grounded in extrinsic properties of either X or parts of X’ (Pereboom Citation2019: 184). Justin Mendelow (Citation2024) argues that Pereboom’s characterization is inadequate because it implies that non-structural properties do not necessitate phenomenal properties, either alone or in combination with structural properties. We argue that Mendelow’s argument rests on premises that Pereboom can reasonably reject

Contemporary philosophy · Dualism · Monism · Physicalism · Advanced Topology and Set Theory · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Mathematical and Theoretical Analysis