The Intensity of Powers
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21293744 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Giovanni Giannini (0000-0001-9427-937X, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2026 |
| Páginas | 1-19 |
| Data de publicação | 2026-07-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2026.2684543 |
| OpenAlex | W7167636403 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 26 |
Dispositions come in degrees. Powers theorists have suggested that this is explained by the fact that powers come in degrees, too. Degrees of powers have usually been characterised in terms of the robustness of the modal connection between power, stimulus, and manifestation. However, modal strength cannot account for all our comparative judgements between dispositions. In this paper, I argue that there is also a different kind of degrees of powers, which I dub intensity. Intensity is connected to the relation between the magnitude of stimuli and manifestations. I first develop a number of models for intensity degrees; then, I argue that intensity is conceptually independent from modal strength, and that it can do important explanatory work
Connection (principal bundle) · Intensity (physics) · Modal · Relation (database) · Robustness (evolution) · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights
Potentiality
The Powers Metaphysic
From an Ontological Point of View
Getting Causes from Powers
Nature's Metaphysics
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals
Overpowering
Modal Logic as Metaphysics
Expanding the vector model for dispositionalist approaches to causation
A plenitude of powers
Megarian Variable Actualism
Natural kinds and dispositions
Explanatory dispositionalism
A Gradable Approach to Dispositions
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |