The deep incoherence of strong necessities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21335622
AutoresHarry Cleeveley (0000-0002-3008-8328, independent scholar, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Volume69
Fascículo2
Páginas800-833
Data de publicação2026-02-07
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInquiry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2023.2232422
OpenAlexW4383313754
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas16

Modal rationalism is the claim that for all p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. This will be true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities, where a strong necessity (for short) is a proposition that is conceivably false, but which is true in all metaphysically possible worlds. But are there any strong necessities? Various alleged examples have been proposed and argued over in the literature, but there is no consensus on whether any is genuine. In this paper, I aim to move the debate forwards by proving that there are in fact no strong necessities. I argue that there are no strong necessities because they are impossible; they are impossible because the very notion of a strong necessity is – despite prima facie appearances – ultimately incoherent. Thus, I argue, it is an a priori truth that there are no strong necessities, and that modal rationalism itself is true

A priori and a posteriori · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Possible world · Prima facie · Proposition · Rationalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science