In defence of the villain

Edwards on deflationism and pluralism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21335631
AutoresJeremy Wyatt (0000-0001-8889-9468, Philosophy Programme, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume66
Fascículo8
Páginas1513-1537
Data de publicação2023-09-14
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInquiry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2022.2049531
OpenAlexW4220857176
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas56

In The Metaphysics of Truth, Doug Edwards offers a sustained case against deflationism about truth and in favour of his preferred pluralist theory of truth. Here, I take up three of the main components of that case. The first is Edwards' account of the distinctive metaphysical commitments of deflationism. His views about this issue have changed over the past few years, and I detail these changes as well as a concern for the views that he develops in the book. Second, I take up the argument that Edwards offers for thinking that deflationism is, in a certain sense, internally unstable. I explain why this argument is inconclusive, outlining three responses to it on behalf of the deflationist. Third, I consider Edwards' novel argument for truth pluralism, which acts as an indirect argument against deflationism. After sorting out some interpretive nuances related to the use of definite descriptions in this argument, I show how the deflationist can resist it. Having responded to Edwards' critique of deflationism, I close by briefly explaining why I take the methodology of deflationism to be especially promising, insofar as it underscores the significance of empirically-informed inquiry about truth

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Pluralism (philosophy) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science