The misapplication dilemma

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364030
AutoresDaniel Webber (0000-0002-0215-0382, Stanford University Stanford California USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume58
Fascículo4
Páginas973-996
Data de publicação2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12485
OpenAlexW4390364934
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas26

When policymakers craft rules for use by the general public, they must take into account the ways in which their rules are likely to be misapplied. Should contractualists and rule consequentialists do the same when they search for rules whose general acceptance would be non‐rejectable or ideal? I argue that these theorists face a dilemma. If they ignore the possibility of misapplication, they end up with an unrealistic view that rejects rules designed to protect us from others’ mistakes. On the other hand, if they take misapplication into account, they end up rejecting rules that appeal to what really matters morally in favor of easier‐to‐apply proxies for these rules. This leaves them unable to say why certain wrong acts are wrong, which in turn may lead them to mistaken verdicts about moral worth and wronging. I show how this misapplication dilemma applies to standard contractualist and rule consequentialist theories, but also suggest how it might generalize to other two‐level theories, including those designed to avoid the ideal world objection

Appeal · Consequentialism · Craft · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Ideal (ethics) · Law and economics · Political science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics