Phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal causality
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21364046 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Lei Zhong (0000-0002-7937-5379, Department of Philosophy The Chinese University of Hong Kong Sha Tin Hong Kong, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 212-232 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-07-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.70002 |
| OpenAlex | W4412027942 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 52 |
There has been extensive debate over whether we can have phenomenal knowledge in the case of epiphenomenalism. This article aims to bring that debate to a close. I first develop a refined causal account of knowledge—one that is modest enough to avoid various putative problems, yet sufficiently robust to undermine the epiphenomenalist position. I then consider and reject several possible responses that an epiphenomenalist might offer. The discussion thus shows that epiphenomenalist accounts of phenomenal knowledge—such as the third‐factor model and the constitutional model—are ultimately indefensible
Causality (physics) · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Physics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness
The Indispensability of Mathematics
Mind in a Physical World
Because Without Cause
Thinking about Consciousness
Physical Realization
The New Mechanical Philosophy
Nature's Metaphysics
Taking Morality Seriously
Metaphysical Dependence
Impossible Worlds
Causation
Mathematical Truth
Equilibrium explanation
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Timing of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink
Causality and Properties
Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
A Causal Theory of Knowing
The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
Intervention, Fixation, and Supervenient Causation
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science
Are there Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena
Probability, explanation, and information
Rejecting epiphobia
Non-naturalistic moral explanation
Dualism all the way down
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Modal Virtue Epistemology
Jackson's Empirical Assumptions
On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science
Beyond possible worlds
Philosophical Explanations
Epiphenomenal Qualia
Phenomenal Concepts, Direct Reference, and the Problem of Double Aspect
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |