Two approaches to metaphysical explanation

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364050
AutoresEzra Rubenstein (0000-0002-6331-773X, University of California Berkeley USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume58
Fascículo4
Páginas1107-1136
Data de publicação2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12491
OpenAlexW4394680782
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas83

Explanatory metaphysics aspires to explain the less fundamental in terms of the more fundamental. But we should recognize two importantly different approaches to this task. According to the generation approach, more basic features of reality generate (or give rise to) less basic features. According to the reduction approach, less perspicuous ways of representing reality reduce to (or collapse into) more perspicuous ways of representing reality. The main goals of this paper are to present the core differences between the two approaches (§2), to demonstrate the distinction's significance (§3), to provide some resources for adjudicating between the approaches (§4), and to argue that the project of explanatory metaphysics needs both (§5)

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science