Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364075
AutoresH Orri Stefánsson (0000-0002-8382-1802, Stockholm University Stockholm Sweden, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume58
Fascículo2
Páginas536-561
Data de publicação2024-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12470
OpenAlexW4378904932
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas46

Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts

Actuarial science · Economics · Epistemology · Harm · Lottery · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology