Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364083
AutoresMelissa Fusco (0000-0001-6512-2357, Columbia University, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume58
Fascículo3
Páginas616-643
Data de publicação2024-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12459
OpenAlexW4381848878
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas36

I respond to a dilemma for Causal Decision Theory (CDT) under determinism, posed in Adam Elga's paper “Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist”. The treatment I present highlights (i) the status of laws as predictors, and (ii) the consequences of decision dependence, which arises natively out of Jeffrey Conditioning and CDT's characteristic equation. My argument leverages decision dependence to work around a key assumption of Elga's proof: to wit, that in the two problems he presents, the CDTer must employ subjunctive‐suppositional (rather than evidential) transformations of a shared prior

Argument (complex analysis) · Business decision mapping · Causal decision theory · Causal model · Computer security · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Determinism · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Evidential decision theory · Evidential reasoning approach · Key (lock) · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Statistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science