Constraints, you, and your victims

Deontologists believe that it is wrong to violate a right even if this will prevent a greater number of violations of the same right. This leads to the paradox of deontology: If respecting everyone's rights is equally important, why should we not minimize the number of rights violations? One possible answer is agent‐based. This answer points out that you should not violate rights even if this will prevent someone else's violations. In this paper, I defend a relational agent‐based justification that focuses on the relation in which the agent stands to her would‐be victims. I argue that this justification can avoid two key objections levelled against agent‐based justifications: It can explain why we are not permitted to minimize our own rights violations, and the justification avoids the charge of being excessively self‐concerned

Computer security · Deontological ethics · Key (lock) · Law and economics · Political science · Relation (database) · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · War, Ethics, and Justification

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