Guessing and Its Limits

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21371504
AutoresHelena Fang (0009-0008-7622-4533, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Volume112
Fascículo3
Páginas563-577
Data de publicação2026-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.70101
OpenAlexW7131129837
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas38

Guessing is the thesis that, roughly put, you may believe something iff it is among the most probable answers to a salient question. The thesis is motivated by observed features of felicitous belief reports when agents confront a question they aren't certain how to answer. This paper raises a novel problem for the thesis, focusing on belief reports in multi‐question scenarios. I introduce and motivate a plausible inter‐question principle for belief, show that Guessing is incompatible with the principle, and argue that the resulting puzzle is intractable and significant—posing a unique challenge to the thesis. Moreover, the problem generalizes to formally parallel “question‐sensitive” accounts in epistemology and philosophy of language, calling for future research into their limits.

Analytic philosophy · Belief revision · Counterfactual conditional · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Salient · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge