Bergson, Pan(en)theism, and ‘Being-in-Life’

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21394920
AutoresKing-Ho Leung (0000-0001-5551-7865, University of St Andrews, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume62
Fascículo2
Páginas293-307
Data de publicação2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSophia (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0038-1527 • E-ISSN: 1873-930X
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11841-022-00933-0
PMID37700803
OpenAlexW4311065031
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas9

Recent philosophy has witnessed a renewed interest in the works and ideas of Henri Bergson (1859–1941). But while contemporary scholarship has sought to rehabilitate Bergson’s insights on time, memory, consciousness, and human freedom, comparatively little attention has been paid to Bergson’s relationship to pantheism. By revisiting the ‘pantheism’ controversy surrounding Bergsonian philosophy during Bergson’s lifetime, this article argues that the panentheistic notion of ‘being-in-God’ can serve as an illuminating framework for the interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy. By examining the ‘pantheist’ readings of Bergson and comparing and contrasting Bergson’s philosophy of life with Spinoza’s panentheistic metaphysics, this paper shows that an account of ‘being-in-Life’ is key to Bergson’s metaphysical outlook as well as his account of philosophy as a practice of ‘intuitive’ thinking. In so doing, this paper highlights some of the implicit religious motifs not only in Bergson’s metaphysical outlook but also in his conception of the task of philosophy

Epistemology · Philosophy of religion · Theism · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis · Philosophy · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices