What's at Stake in the Race Debate

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21395043
AutoresRon Mallon (0000-0001-8347-8939, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume60
FascículoS1
Páginas54-72
Data de publicação2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12480
OpenAlexW4288925122
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas37

How can there be so much apparent disagreement about what race is, when there is so much agreement on the facts surrounding race? In this paper, I develop this puzzle and consider several interpretations of work in the philosophy of race to try to answer it, several ways of understanding what the metaphysics of race is doing. I consider and reject the possibility that apparent disagreement is metaphysically substantive, and I also consider and reject the view that apparent disagreement primarily reflects semantic disagreements. Instead, I suggest that apparent first‐order disagreement over the existence and character of race is a part of a broader, metalinguistic negotiation or conversation about how racial terms can or ought to be used, and I note a range of considerations—including semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, and ethical—that properly play a role in this discussion

Character (mathematics) · Conversation · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Negotiation · Order (exchange) · Race (biology) · Social science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Race, Genetics, and Society