Immanence in Schelling and Hegel in the Jena Period

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21395085
AutoresPaolo Diego Bubbio (0000-0002-9286-7722), Daniele Fulvi (0000-0002-8849-8207, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume60
Fascículo3
Páginas353-387
Data de publicação2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12474
OpenAlexW4286001472
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas45

In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected the conception of God as coinciding with the moral order, which they attribute to Fichte; such coincidence, in their view, turned God into a transcendent and merely moral Being. In an effort to demonstrate their distance from Fichte's view, we contend, Schelling and Hegel advocated for a metaphysical (rather than merely moral) and immanent (rather than transcendent) understanding of God, conceived in its inextricable relation with nature and self‐consciousness. We conclude by demonstrating that the cooperation between Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period led them to develop an analogous conception of immanence—which already foreshadows, however, the different directions that Schelling and Hegel take in their mature works

Aesthetics · Consciousness · Epistemology · Hegelianism · Immanence · Metaphysics · Order (exchange) · Period (music) · Relation (database) · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Historical Thought