How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory

Dilemma · Epistemology · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Ontology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Philosophy

• The Bounds of Reason

  Herbert Gintis•The bounds of reason•2014

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• Convention

  Open Access•David Lewis, David K Lewis•Convention•2002

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• Understanding Institutions

  Francesco Guala•Understanding Institutions•2016

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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection

  David G Pearce•Econometrica•1984

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• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

  Robert J Aumann, Robert Aumann et al.•Econometrica•1995

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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

  B Douglas Bernheim•Econometrica•1984

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• Agreeing to Disagree

  Robert J Aumann•The Annals of Statistics•1976

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• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality

  Robert J Aumann•Econometrica•1987

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• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

  Open Access•John C Harsanyi•Management Science•1967

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• Belief revision in games

  Open Access•Robert Stalnaker•Mathematical Social Sciences•1998

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• A Logical Framework for Convention

  Open Access•Giacomo Sillari•Synthese•2005

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• Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics

  Open Access•Christopher Clarke•Philosophy of Science•2016

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• Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality

  Marco Mariotti•The Economic Journal•1995

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• The bounds of reason

  Herbert M Gintis•The bounds of reason•2009

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• Convention

  David Lewis•Convention•2002

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