Explicating Exact versus Conceptual Replication

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21461687
AutoresRobert Hudson (0000-0002-6713-1043, University of Saskatchewan, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume88
Fascículo6
Páginas2493-2514
Data de publicação2023-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoErkenntnis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10670-021-00464-z
PMID37388139
OpenAlexW3202424974
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas20

What does it mean to replicate an experiment? A distinction is often drawn between ‘exact’ (or ‘direct’) and ‘conceptual’ replication. However, in recent work, Uljana Feest argues that the notion of replication in itself, whether exact or conceptual, is flawed due to the problem of systematic error, and Edouard Machery argues that, although the notion of replication is not flawed, we should nevertheless dispense with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication. My plan in this paper is to defend the value of replication, along with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication, from the critiques of Feest and Machery. To that end, I provide an explication of conceptual replication, and distinguish it from what I call ‘experimental’ replication. On the basis, then, of a tripartite distinction between exact, experimental and conceptual replication, I argue in response to Feest that replication is still informative despite the prospect of systematic error. I also rebut Machery’s claim that conceptual replication is fundamentally confused and wrongly conflates replication and extension, and in turn raise some objections to his own Resampling Account of replication

Biology · Epistemology · Explication · Computer Science · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Virology