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Dynamic communication mechanism design

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21470530
AutoresRyuji Sano (0000-0002-9764-5846, Yokohama National University, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume57
Fascículo1
Páginas163-180
Data de publicação2021-07-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSocial Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y
OpenAlexW3133924690
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas24

Common value auction · Economics · Ex-ante · Incentive · Incentive compatibility · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Mechanism Design · Microeconomics · Monotone polygon · Public finance · Strategic dominance · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics

  • Optimal Auction Design

    Open Access•Roger B Myerson, Roger Myerson•Mathematics of Operations Research•1981

  • Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation

    Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal•Journal of Political Economy•2019

  • Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare

    Michael H Rothkopf, Thomas J Teisberg et al.•Journal of Political Economy•1990

  • Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints

    Dilip Mookherjee, Masatoshi Tsumagari•Journal of Political Economy•2014

Altamente citadoNão

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