The Because/in Order to Distinction and the Ethics of Euthanasia

Demonstrating that Death Is Not an Unconditional Evil for Double Effect Analysis

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21497282
AutoresHarrison Lee (0009-0000-5583-094X, Department of Philosophy and Religion University of Mississippi Oxford MS USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Data de publicação2026-05-12
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1002/japp.70093
OpenAlexW7160955883
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas48

Many ethicists who have opposed euthanasia have nonetheless approved of the administration of palliative sedation (PS) under conditions where they have believed it is likely to hasten death. This reasoning typically reflects the doctrine of double effect (DDE), which prohibits causing evil intentionally but permits causing it merely foreseeably under some circumstances. In other ethical contexts, Frances Kamm has emphasized another distinction, namely the distinction between performing an action because one will thereby cause some consequence and performing an action in order to (i.e. from an intention to) cause a consequence. Here I argue that it could be permissible to administer PS to a patient because one would thereby cause him to die rather than causing him to endure suffering that would be worse for him than death. However, I argue that the because/in order to distinction is ethically insignificant in this context. It is no worse, I argue, to act in order to cause a patient to die than it would be to act because one would thereby cause a patient to die. Thus, I conclude that death is not an unconditional evil for the purposes of DDE analysis, and that euthanasia can be permissible

Cause of action · Doctrine · Palliative sedation · Principle of double effect · Ethics in medical practice · Organ Donation and Transplantation · Palliative Care and End-of-Life Issues

Ferramentas

Abrir DOI