Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21501832 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Laura Gow (0000-0002-7521-8480, Department of Philosophy University of Liverpool Liverpool UK, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2021 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 627-635 |
| Data de publicação | 2021-09-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12376 |
| OpenAlex | W3200322285 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 9 |
David Papineau develops a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own “qualitative view” according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineau's theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Dilemma · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Essentialism · Metaphysics · Notice · Perception · Sensory system · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citações por ano | 0,2 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Altamente citado | Não |