Entitled to Embezzlement? The Case of Successful Executives Working for Rich Heirs

Dados Bibliográficos

ID2153241
AutoresPetter Gottschalk (0000-0002-8120-0308, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway, autor correspondente), Cecilie Asting (BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway)
Ano2020
Volume41
Fascículo3
Páginas269-277
Data de publicação2020-03-03
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDeviant Behavior (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0163-9625 • E-ISSN: 1521-0456
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01639625.2018.1564365
OpenAlexW2907503043
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas30

In family firms, there is a distinction between family members and nonfamily members. Research reviewed in this article indicates that family firms tend to be operated to enhance the well-being of owning families and their members. Nonfamily executives are often treated as second-class individuals in the organization. There is an asymmetrical distribution of power among family and nonfamily. From the theory of convenience, we apply equity theory in the motivational dimension, principal–agent theory in the opportunity dimension, and neutralization theory in the willingness dimension to shed light on deviant behaviors by nonfamily executives in family firms. We present two case studies from Norway – a former CEO and a former CFO in family firms – who both were sentenced to prison for embezzlement

Business · Corporate governance · Criminal law · Criminology · Demographic economics · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · Embezzlement · Equity (law · Political science · Principal–agent problem · Prison · Corporate Finance and Governance · Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences · Family Business Performance and Succession · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology · Finance

Ferramentas

Abrir DOISci-Hub