The disunity of moral judgment

Evidence and implications

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21591703
AutoresDavid Sackris (0000-0002-3914-3311, Arapahoe Community College, autor correspondente), Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen (0000-0002-9294-8645, Departments of Philosophy and Forensic Science, University of Toronto - Mississauga, Philosophy, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada)
Ano2024
Volume37
Fascículo2
Páginas351-370
Data de publicação2024-02-17
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2056437
OpenAlexW4220860588
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas48

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as “moral judgments”, then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics

Epistemology · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology