Situating evaluativism in psychiatry
On the axiological dimension of phenomenological psychopathology and Fulford’s value-based practice
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21591972 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alessandro Guardascione (0000-0002-1617-561X, School of Philosophy, University College of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 267-303 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2350489 |
| OpenAlex | W4396831616 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 71 |
Evaluativists hold that psychiatric disorders have a factual and evaluative dimension and recognize that psychiatric patients have an active role in shaping their symptoms, influencing the development of their disorders, and the outcome of psychiatric therapy. This is reflected in person-centered approaches that explicitly consider the role of values in psychiatric conceptualization, classification, and decision-making. In this respect, in light of the recent partnership between Fulford's value-based practice (VBP), and Stanghellini's phenomenological-hermeneutic-dynamical (P.H.D) psychotherapy method, this paper presents a comparative analysis of two person-centered approaches to psychiatric care currently discussed within the literature. I claim that while these approaches share some core ideas, they also present important divergences concerning their axiological underpinnings, which could potentially compromise their partnership. In particular, by exploring their theoretical, practical, and ethical dimensions, I show that these models have different conceptions of what values are, which, in turn, affect their understanding of how values relate to the person and how clinicians can identify them. Finally, I argue that although Fulford's and Stanghellini's approaches are prima facie compatible and complementary, developing a "combined analytic-plus-phenomenological form of values-based practice" should address fundamental conceptual issues if it is to become a consistent and coherent method for psychiatric care
Epistemology · Psychiatry · Psychoanalysis · Psychopathology · Psychotherapist · Computer Science · Historical Psychiatry and Medical Practices · Mathematics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications
Lost in Dialogue
Emotions and Personhood
Phenomenological Psychology
Cartesian Meditations
Epistemic injustice in psychiatry
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry
The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology
Approbation and Disapprobation in Husserl’s Phenomenology
The epistemic harms of empathy in phenomenological psychopathology
Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism
Feeling as Consciousness of Value
Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice
Phenomenological method and contemporary ethics
Applied phenomenology
A values-based phenomenology for substance use disorder
General Psychopathology
Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937)
Disease, illness, sickness, health, healing and wholeness
State of the field
Inductive Risk and Values in Science
Evaluation in Action. A Phenomenological Reassessment of Ricœur’s Early Ethics
Ordinary Language Philosophy as Phenomenological Research
The concepts of health and illness revisited
Critical Psychiatry
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |