Vitalism and panpsychism in the philosophy of Anne Conway

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21597907
AutoresOlivia Branscum (Department of Philosophy, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume32
Fascículo5
Páginas1030-1051
Data de publicação2024-09-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2023.2276719
OpenAlexW4388567806
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas46

Anne Conway (1631–1679) is often described as a vitalist. Scholars typically take this to mean that Conway considers life to be ubiquitous throughout the world. While Conway is indeed a vitalist in this sense, I argue that she is also committed to a stronger view: namely, the panpsychist view that mental capacities are ubiquitous and fundamental in creation. Reading Conway as a panpsychist highlights several aspects of her philosophy that deserve further attention, especially her accounts of emanative causation and universal perfectibility. There are also historical benefits to interpreting Conway as a panpsychist. Through its history, ‘vitalism’ has often been used to describe philosophies that draw a sharp line between living and non-living nature; surely, Conway is not a vitalist in this way. Moreover, some of Conway’s contemporaries (for instance, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More) are sometimes regarded as vitalists, but were not panpsychists. It is important to distinguish between Conway’s vitalism and her version of panpsychism and to add a term like ‘panpsychism’ to the interpretive lexicon. Otherwise, we run the risk of undervaluing Conway’s originality within her own context and beyond

Epistemology · Sociology · Vitalism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · History · Multicultural Socio-Legal Studies · Philosophy