Horwich’s Epistemological Fundamentality and Folk Commitment
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21655270 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joseph Ulatowski (0000-0003-3019-1269, University of Waikato, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Fascículo | S2 |
| Páginas | 575-592 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-12-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Axiomathes (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1122-1151 • E-ISSN: 1572-8390 |
| Editora | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10516-022-09619-1 |
| OpenAlex | W4225287602 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 16 |
There are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich’s minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: 〈 p 〉 is true if and only if p . The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and how they judge that a proposition is true, a significant amount of data collected over the years reveal that the ordinary or folk view of truth is compatible with the epistemological fundamentality of alethic minimalism. This, I take it, suggests that people share in the same intuitions that form the bedrock of Horwich’s minimalism
Axiom · Epistemology · Linguistics · Philosophy of science · Proposition · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Altamente citado | Não |
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