Conditionals As Representative Inferences

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21655342
AutoresRobert Van Rooij (0000-0001-6819-6685, University of Amsterdam, autor correspondente), Katrin Schulz (0000-0001-8573-9768, University of Amsterdam)
Ano2021
Volume31
Fascículo3
Páginas437-452
Data de publicação2021-06-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAxiomathes (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1122-1151 • E-ISSN: 1572-8390
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10516-020-09477-9
OpenAlexW3019531115
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas38

According to Adams (Inquiry 8:166–197, 1965), the acceptability of an indicative conditional goes with the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. However, some conditionals seem to be inappropriate, although their corresponding conditional probability is high. These are cases with a missing link between antecedent and consequent. Other conditionals are appropriate even though the conditional probability is low. Finally, we have the so-called biscuit conditionals. In this paper we will generalize analyses of Douven (Synthese 164:19–44, 2008) and others to account for the appropriateness of conditionals in terms of evidential support. Our generalization involves making use of Value , or intensity. We will show how this generalization helps to account for biscuit conditionals and conditional threats and promises. Finally, a link is established between this analysis of conditionals and an analysis of generic sentences

Conditional probability · Generalization · Statistics · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Artificial Intelligence