Why Moral Intuitions are Not Emotions

A Critical Examination

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21700985
AutoresGiulia Cantamessi (0009-0007-7377-0718, University of Pavia, autor correspondente), Dario Cecchini (0000-0003-0943-5898, North Carolina State University)
Ano2025
Volume29
Fascículo4
Páginas681-697
Data de publicação2025-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Journal of Ethics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1382-4554 • E-ISSN: 1572-8609
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10892-025-09518-8
OpenAlexW4409945077
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas33

In this paper we argue that moral intuitions, understood as non-doxastic mental states, should not be reduced to emotions. We reject the moral-intuition-as-emotion view by arguing that having an emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a moral intuition. In particular, we deny the necessity claim by stressing the existence of dispassionate moral intuitions, which lack emotional phenomenology, and by claiming that some moral intuitions have no corresponding emotions, as no emotion apprehends objects in terms of the same moral features. We then argue that moral intuitions and emotions consist of different mental attitudes towards their moral contents, a difference which explains why experiencing an emotion is not sufficient to have a moral intuition. Our arguments have significant implications for current debates on the epistemic function of moral intuitions and the roles of emotions in moral lives, and we take our view to be able to explain important features of these mental states without neglecting their differences

Epistemology · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics in Business and Education · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology