When Monitoring Facilitates Trust

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21701622
AutoresEmma C Gordon (0000-0002-0117-2811, University of Glasgow, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume25
Fascículo4
Páginas557-571
Data de publicação2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-022-10286-9
OpenAlexW4229034379
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas30

It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts B to X), but sometimes also two-place trust (i.e., A trusts B, see, e.g., Baier 1986). Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which monitoring can be conducive to two-place trust, and to instances of three-place trust that are likely to be repeated over time—especially when previously established two-place trust has broken down. The result, I hope, is not any kind of abandoning of the important idea that monitoring can undermine trust, but an appreciation of where the conflict between monitoring and trust doesn’t lie – one from which future work will hopefully be better positioned to illuminate where exactly the conflict is

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