Blame and Proportionality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21702009
AutoresMarta Johansson Werkmäster (0000-0003-4990-5153, Lund University), Jakob Green Werkmäster (0000-0001-7210-6857, Lund University, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume28
Fascículo2
Páginas235-249
Data de publicação2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-024-10454-z
OpenAlexW4400467158
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas29

The ethics of blame includes conditions determining whether an instance of blame is permissible. One generally recognised condition is that blame should be proportionate. If it is not proportionate, that speaks against its permissibility. All the same, what exactly amounts to proportionate blame is currently under-theorised. In this paper, we aim to amend this. More precisely, we distinguish between private and overt blame and highlight some of their differences – e.g., that they aggregate differently. Then, we develop an account of proportional blame and draw out some practical implications of our account

Blame · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification