Controversial views and moral realism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21702320
AutoresHenrik Rydenfelt (0000-0003-3739-4712, University of Helsinki, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume44
Fascículo2
Páginas165-176
Data de publicação2023-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoMetamedicine (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0166-2031 • E-ISSN: 1573-1200
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11017-023-09616-4
PMID36867309
OpenAlexW3197525085
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas13

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward

Alternative medicine · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · History of medicine · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Philosophy of medicine · Psychiatry · Realism · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology