Comparing deterministic agents

A new argument for compatibilism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21702807
AutoresMarcela Herdova (0000-0002-5724-532X, Florida State University, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume27
Fascículo1
Páginas106-121
Data de publicação2024-01-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869795.2023.2259403
OpenAlexW4386913404
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas23

This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism

Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Moral responsibility · Thought experiment · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification