True by Default

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21876321
AutoresAaron M Griffith (0000-0002-7330-8386, William & Mary, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume8
Fascículo1
Páginas92-109
Data de publicação2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2020.42
OpenAlexW3197611765
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas38

This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers

Epistemology · Existentialism · Linguistics · Ontology · Semantic theory of truth · Statistics · Truth value · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science