A Criterion of Literality for Names

Dados Bibliográficos

ID22329394
AutoresNikhil Mahant (0000-0002-0007-6406, Uppsala University, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume57
Fascículo171
Páginas133-161
Data de publicação2025-12-17
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCritica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905
EditoraUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX)
DOI10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1754
OpenAlexW7125591337
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas32

In recent years, several kinds of non-referential uses of names have received attention within semantics. However, the lack of a principled basis for drawing the distinction between uses that a semantic theory of names must account for (‘literal’ uses) and other uses that it need not explain by itself (‘non-literal uses’) represents an important deficiency in the debate. A prominent objection (the ‘Sceptic’s Challenge’) against semantic views that treat predicative uses as literal exemplifies the kind of problem that can result from this deficiency. This article proposes a general manner of drawing the line between literal and non-literal uses of names. Further, by providing a rationale for treating predicative uses as literal, it also provides a response to the Sceptic’s Challenge

Predicative expression · Proper noun · Proposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation