Fruitlessness of Anti-Corruption Agencies
Lessons from the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 2308554 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kwame Asamoah (0000-0002-8331-8123, University of Ghana), Emmanuel Ababio Ofosu-Mensah (0000-0003-4376-1849, University of Ghana) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Fascículo | 7 |
| Páginas | 987-1001 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Asian and African Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0021-9096 • E-ISSN: 1745-2538 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0021909618762575 |
| OpenAlex | W2794823241 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 4 |
| Referências citadas | 48 |
Political corruption has become one of the most topical issues in the political discourse in Ghana. This stems from the fact that corruption has become so endemic and systemic in Ghanaian polity with its negative effects on the economy. Indeed, political corruption negatively affects job creation, investment potentials, infrastructural development and generally the standard of living of the people. It is within this context that anti-corruption institutions have been established in Ghana to address the menace of corruption. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is one of such institutions established under the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana tasked with the responsibility of addressing the problem of corruption in Ghanaian public administration system. This paper examines the extent to which the Commission has achieved this constitutional mandate of addressing the problem of corruption. The study finds that some drawbacks which inhibit the potency of CHRAJ in addressing the problem of corruption include lack of political will by the governing elite to support the institution, eroding confidence of the Commission, the trend of appointing the Head of the Commission in an acting capacity, constitutional weaknesses, poor capacity building support and low motivation. The paper therefore offers pragmatic policy suggestions to address the inherent deficiencies of the Commission with the objective of making it more functional
Commission · Economic Justice · Human rights · Language change · Mandate · Political corruption · Political science · Politics · Polity · Corruption and Economic Development · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Law · Public Administration
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Dodging the grabbing hand
Bad apples in bad barrels
The economics of corruption
Theory of the firm
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Controlling Corruption
Corruption and Economic Growth
Corruption and Government
The Quest for Good Governance
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
A socio-cultural approach to public sector corruption in Africa
The calculus of corruption
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and Political Corruption
Corruption and Development
The New Public Service
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Regional variation in voter turnout in Europe
Delegation to Supranational Institutions
Bureaucratic Morality in Africa
Close but no Cigar
Indignation or Resignation
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Finding God' or 'Moral Disengagement' in the Fight Against Corruption in Developing Countries? Evidence From India and Nigeria
The Roots of Corruption-the Ghanaian Enquiry
Corruption and Political Development
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,67 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 4 |