Aristotle, agents, and actions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID23146381
AutoresIakovos Vasiliou (Queen's University, autor correspondente)
Ano2011
Páginas170-190
Data de publicação2011-08-18
Open AccessSim
TipoCHAPTER
Periódico'Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics' (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditoraCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/cbo9780511977626.009
OpenAlexW2489841258
ISBN9780511977626
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17

At the heart of Aristotle’s account of ethical upbringing is habituation. At least all of the virtues of character – justice, generosity, temperance, courage, and so on – just are habituated states brought about by the repeated doing of actions of a certain ethical type. We are not born courageous or cowardly (although we may have natural dispositions in one direction or the other); rather, we are made courageous or cowardly insofar as we have engaged in courageous or cowardly actions in our lives. Engaging in actions of a certain type gives rise to the corresponding habituated state of character. In short, “we become just by doing just things, temperate by doing temperate things, and courageous by doing courageous things” (N.E. ii.1, 1103a34–b2). Let us call this idea “the habituation principle” (HP). As the explicit analogy with craft (technê) in N.E. ii.1 shows, the habituation principle is itself value neutral: one becomes a good harpist or a good builder if one acquires good building or harp-playing habits, but a bad one if not; similarly one becomes a virtuous person if she engages in virtuous acts, but a bad or vicious person if one doesn’t.

Analogy · Character (mathematics) · Courage · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Generosity · Habituation · Political science · Theology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Leadership, Courage, and Heroism Studies · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology