Speaking With The Same Voice As Reason

Contemporary readers of Greek ethics tend to favour those accounts of the virtuous ideal according to which virtue involves the development of our non-rational—appetitive and emotional— motivations as well as of our rational motivations. So our contemporaries find much of interest and sympathy in Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a condition in which reason does not simply override our appetites and emotions, but these non-rational motivations themselves ‘speak with the same voice as reason’.

Classical Philosophy and Thought · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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  Nicholas D Smith•Summoning Knowledge in Plato's…•2019

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• Plato on Education and Art

  Rachana Kamtekar•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

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• The Practice Of A Philosopher

  Raphael Woolf•Oxford Studies in Ancient…•2004

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  Open Access•George Grote•Plato and the Other Companions of…•2010

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• Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving

  Open Access•M F Burnyeat, Myles Burnyeat•The Classical Quarterly•1976

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• The Fragility of Goodness

  Open Access•Martha C Nussbaum, Martha Nussbaum•Fragility of Goodness•2001

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