A Critical Examination of the Historical Origins of Connexive Logic
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 23200631 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Wolfgang Lenzen (0000-0002-5456-1685, Department of Philosophy, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 16-35 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-01-02 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | History and Philosophy of Logic (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0144-5340 • E-ISSN: 1464-5149 |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01445340.2019.1650610 |
| OpenAlex | W2969554676 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 9 |
It is often assumed that Aristotle, Boethius, Chrysippus, and other ancient logicians advocated a connexive conception of implication according to which no proposition entails, or is entailed by, its own negation. Thus Aristotle claimed that the proposition ‘if B is not great, B itself is great [...] is impossible’. Similarly, Boethius maintained that two implications of the type ‘If p then r’ and ‘If p then not-r’ are incompatible. Furthermore, Chrysippus proclaimed a conditional to be ‘sound when the contradictory of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent’, a view which, in the opinion of S. McCall, entails the aforementioned theses of Aristotle and Boethius. Now a critical examination of the historical sources shows that the ancient logicians most likely meant their theses as applicable only to ‘normal’ conditionals with antecedents which are not self-contradictory. The corresponding restrictions of Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses to such self-consistent antecedents, however, turn out to be theorems of ordinary modal logic and thus don’t give rise to any non-classical system of genuinely connexive logic.
Antecedent (behavioral psychology) · Deontic logic · Epistemology · Linguistics · Negation · Proposition · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citações por ano | 0,75 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Altamente citado | Não |