Relational Egalitarianism and the Grounds of Entitlements to Healthcare
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 23201166 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Brian Berkey (0000-0002-4527-027X, University of Pennsylvania, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 85 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Les ateliers de l'éthique (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1718-9977 • E-ISSN: 1718-9977 |
| Editora | Consortium Erudit (PUBLISHER • CA) |
| DOI | 10.7202/1061220ar |
| OpenAlex | W2956629525 |
| Idioma | FR |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 19 |
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that much theorizing about the value of equality, and about justice more generally, has focused unduly on distributive issues and neglected the importance of egalitarian social relationships. As a result, relational egalitarian views, according to which the value of egalitarian social relations provides the grounds of the commitment that we ought to have to equality, have gained prominence as alternatives to more fundamentally distributive accounts of the basis of egalitarianism, and of justice-based entitlements. In this paper, I will suggest that reflecting on the kind of explanation of a certain class of our justice-based entitlements that relational egalitarian considerations can offer raises doubts about the project, endorsed by at least some relational egalitarians, of attempting to ground all entitlements of justice in the value of egalitarian social relationships. I will use the entitlement to healthcare provision as my central example. The central claim that I will defend is that even if relational egalitarian accounts can avoid implausible implications regarding the extension of justice-based entitlements to health care, it is more difficult to see how they can avoid what seem to me to be implausible explanations of why individuals have the justice-based entitlements that they do. To the extent that I am correct that relational egalitarian views are committed to offering implausible explanations of the grounds of justice-based entitlements to healthcare, this seems to me to provide at least some support for a more fundamentally distributive approach to thinking about justice in healthcare provision.
Distributive justice · Economic Justice · Economics · Egalitarianism · Entitlement (fair division) · Health care · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
What Is the Point of Equality?
Democratic Egalitarianism versus Luck Egalitarianism
The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians
Luck egalitarians versus relational egalitarians
The Practice of Equality
A Theory of Justice
Living Together as Equals
On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice
Disadvantage
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions
What is Equality? Part 1
What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality
Distributive and relational equality
Private Government
What is Egalitrianism
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,6 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |