Symposium on the Fixity of the Past

This paper evaluates a new argument for the fixity of the past, recently defended by Wesley H. Holliday in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review 121). The fixity of the past is a premise used to argue for incompatibilism, and one that many compatibilists deny. Holliday claims that his argument ends the stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists concerning this premise. It is argued that Holliday’s argument, while superficially quite plausible, has two related faults. First, it employs a premise that compatibilists are antecedently committed to rejecting. Second, the intuitive motivation given for that premise does not in fact motivate the premise. Together, these problems render Holliday’s argument question-begging.

Byzantine Studies and History · Classical Antiquity Studies · History