Response-Dependent Realism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID23569629
AutoresMark Lebar (Philosophy, Florida State University, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Páginas465-483
Data de publicação2023-09-18
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoCHAPTER
PeriódicoOxford Handbook of Moral Realism (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190068226.013.18
OpenAlexW4386828050
ISBN9780190068226
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas17

Writers on metaethics divide over two conceptions of what moral realism comes to. The first of these—the “Modest” conception—commits only to the truth-aptness of moral judgments. The second—the “Robust” conception—commits to the mind- or stance- or response-independence of such judgments. In this chapter, I take up the relationship of response-dependent (RD) metaethical theories to these two conceptions of realism. While some proponents of RD views see themselves as opponents of realism, I do not. On the Modest conception, RD views are realist. And the resources they have to respond to the challenges of the Robust conception are considerable. Moreover, a capably mounted form of RD, responsive to the motivations for Robust realism, puts pressure on the resources Robust realism has for rejecting response-dependence. If so, the theoretical distance between RD views and Robust realist views may be smaller than one might suppose.

Critical realism (philosophy of perception) · Epistemology · Independence (probability theory) · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Philosophical realism · Realism · Statistics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy