On Human Beings, Computers and Representational-Computational vs Hermeneutic-Dialogical Approaches to Human Cognition and Communication

Dados Bibliográficos

ID2390694
AutoresRagnar Rommetveit (University of Oslo, autor correspondente)
Ano1998
Volume4
Fascículo2
Páginas213-233
Data de publicação1998-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCulture & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1354-067X • E-ISSN: 1461-7056
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1354067x9800400204
OpenAlexW2027923297
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas30

Current representational-computational approaches to human cognition and communication, it is argued, represent natural-scientifically coached ramifications of an analyticrationalist philosophical tradition concerned with formal features D of 'pure' and de-contextualized human reason. Scholars conducting their inquiries within hermeneutic-dialogically founded traditions, on the other hand, are seriously concerned with the inherent perspectivity of human cognition and the embeddedness of linguistically mediated meaning in pervasive background conditions and fluctuating human interests and concerns. The epistemological gulf between analytic-rationalist and herrneneutic-dialogical approaches is reflected in their answers to the question whether the researcher's and informant's mastery of meaning 'from within' should be considered a cumbersome residual or an opaque, yet indispensable resource. What has to be dealt with as a residual to get rid of in attempts at externalization and machine representation of human knowledge and reasoning, it is suggested, may constitute an indispensable resource in any potentially emancipatory study of language and mind

Cognition · Cognitive science · Dialogical self · Embeddedness · Epistemology · Externalization · Social science · Sociology · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Language and cultural evolution · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology