Critical social philosophy, Honneth and the role of primary intersubjectivity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID2397938
AutoresSomogy Vargas (0000-0001-9383-7843, University of Osnabrück, Germany, autor correspondente), Shaun Gallagher (0000-0002-3147-9929, University of Memphis)
Ano2012
Volume15
Fascículo2
Páginas243-260
Data de publicação2012-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEuropean Journal of Social Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1368-4310 • E-ISSN: 1461-7137
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1368431011423606
OpenAlexW2090936451
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas58

Gesellschaftskritik, or social philosophy that aims to provide firm criticism of pathological social practices, requires normatively grounded evaluative principles. In this article, we assess different possibilities for such principles with focus on a model that takes specific patterns of intersubjective interaction as its point of reference. We argue that in order to understand the full significance of this 'intersubjective turn' for social philosophy, and to strengthen the normative foundation of social philosophy, we need to distinguish several levels of intersubjectivity and, in particular, focus on the somewhat neglected level of primary intersubjectivity. The article will discuss the account of primary intersubjectivity in Honneth's work. We show that Honneth's account runs into difficulties, and drawing on recent findings in developmental psychology, we suggest a rethinking of elementary recognition in terms of 'affective proximity'. This both renders the account less susceptible to criticism and provides a normative perspective that can effortlessly enter into interdisciplinary collaboration

Criticism · Epistemology · Intersubjectivity · Normative · Political science · Sociology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Social Representations and Identity