The other side of freedom

On the sociality of ethics

Dados Bibliográficos

ID2402019
AutoresKatherine J L Miller (0000-0003-1438-5717, Western Oregon University, autor correspondente), Steven Luke (0000-0003-0427-4773, New York University), Steven Lukes (New York University)
Ano2020
Volume20
Fascículo4
Páginas414-437
Data de publicação2020-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAnthropological Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1463-4996 • E-ISSN: 1741-2641
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1463499619890762
OpenAlexW2995516032
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas27

The social character of ethics is best revealed by exploring the complex dynamics linking individuals' freedom to moral requirements. In this article, we consider James Laidlaw's influential proposal that an anthropology of ethics makes freedom central to what is distinctively ethical in human life, but we argue that it unduly restricts the proposed scope of anthropology. This account of freedom is both overly cognitive, focusing on reflection, viewed as involving distance, decision, reasoning and doubt, and too individualistic, downplaying the importance of freedom's normative background and excluding from consideration many documented forms of ethical experience. We propose instead an alternative, more open-ended conceptualization of freedom, distinguishing a concept of freedom that differs from its widely varying conceptions, and drawing on ethnographic material from the Hunza Valley in Northern Pakistan and elsewhere to illustrate multiple ways in which the constitution of selves and normative constraints impinge on one another

Conceptualization · Constitution · Epistemology · Individualism · Methodological individualism · Normative · Political science · Reflective equilibrium · Sociality · Sociology · Anthropological Studies and Insights · Cambodian History and Society · Law · Philosophy · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies