The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 24061981 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Daphna Lewinsohn‐Zamir (0000-0002-4460-2076, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2012 |
| Volume | 168 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 5-26 |
| Data de publicação | 2012-01-01 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Editora | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245612799440014 |
| OpenAlex | W2093134836 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
The doctrine of efficient breach is based on the belief that the risk of postcontractual bargaining failure under property rules is greater than the risk of the courts' miscalculation of damages under liability rules. The article presents the findings of two experiments that challenge this belief and suggest that courts systematically undercompensate promisees. Implementation of the efficient-breach doctrine might therefore lead to underdeterrence and inefficiency.
Doctrine · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Computer Science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Legal principles and applications
| Citações por ano | 0,2 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Altamente citado | Não |