Debunking Arguments in Ethics
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 24163723 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Heinrich Sauer (0000-0001-8039-0376, Utrecht University, autor correspondente), Hanno Sauer |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-07-26 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Periódico | Debunking Arguments in Ethics (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/9781108529181 |
| ISBN | 9781108529181 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 34 |
| Referências citadas | 118 |
In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.
Epistemology · Sociology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Permission to Dream
Loosening the Need-Concept Tie
A Political and Ameliorative State of Nature
When Genealogy Is Called For
The Benefits of Reverse-Engineering
A Genetic History of Thought
Ideas Worth Having
The Uses of Intrinsic Value
Epigraph
The Normative Significance of Pragmatic Genealogies
Ideas as Remedies to Inconveniences
Why We Came to Think as We Do
Moral Progress and Evolution
No need to get up from the armchair (if you’re interested in debunking arguments in metaethics)
Disagreement and Doubts About Darwinian Debunking
Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge
Genealogy
Moral Judgement and Moral Progress
Deontology and Utilitarianism in Real Life
A moral critique of psychological debunking
Defusing the Regress Challenge to Debunking Arguments
Online Misinformation and “Phantom Patterns”
Speciesism and tribalism
A Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments in ethics
Defensive debunking arguments
Why the debunking threat won’t go away
Prospects for pure procedural moral progress
Thought experiments and experimental ethics
How far can genealogies affect the space of reasons? Vindication, justification and excuses
In Search of Greene's Argument
The Golden Rule
The co-evolution of virtue and desert
The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation
How Gene-Culture Coevolution can-but Probably did not-Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth
Ethics
Moral Inferences
Living High and Letting Die
Character as Moral Fiction
Warrant and Proper Function
Natural Moralities
How We Get Along
The Expanding Circle
Compassion Fade
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem
The neural basis of human moral cognition
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories
Morality as Cooperation
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
The emotional basis of moral judgments
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
Ethics and Intuitions
The essential moral self
Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment
Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-Race Pain
Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free
Against Empathy
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers
Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment
Action, Outcome, and Value
Pushing moral buttons
A cognitive developmental approach to morality
‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale
Moral psychology is relationship regulation
Understanding Libertarian Morality
Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment
Crime and punishment
A Defense of Moral Deference
XIV—Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology
On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements
The emotional dog and its rational tail
Confirmation Bias
The weirdest people in the world?
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Telling more than we can know
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition
Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim?
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics
Moral Emotions and Intuitions
The Humean Theory of Motivation
The Sources of Normativity
Disgust Sensitivity, Political Conservatism, and Voting
Defending Moral Realism from Empirical Evidence of Disagreement
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
Famine, Affluence, and Morality
The Geography of Morals
In the Beginning Was the Deed
The logic of social exchange
Constructed Criteria
Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness
Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
On Doing Things Intentionally
The Possibility of Practical Reason
The Emotional Construction of Morals
Reasons and Persons
The Masturbation Taboo and the Rise of Routine Male Circumcision
Normative Ethics and the Prospects of an Empirical Contribution to Assessment of Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism
Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence
The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action
Moral Knowledge by Perception 1
Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting
The Archimedean Urge
Off Her Trolley? Frances Kamm and the Metaphysics of Morality
Unequal Vividness and Double Effect
Tracing the threads
The neuroscientific study of free will
How not to test for philosophical expertise
Moral Relativism Defended
Toward Fin de siecle Ethics
Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity
A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research
Darwin and moral realism
Revolutionary Expressivism
Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness
Evolution and Impartiality
Ethics Without Principles
The Good in the Right
Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning
From Jerusalem to Jericho
Fieldwork in Familiar Places
Varieties of moral personality
The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience
Effect of feeling good on helping
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations
| Obras citantes distintas | 34 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 4,25 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 33 |